The “Fusion” of Law and Equity?: A Canadian Perspective on the Substantive, Jurisdictional, or Non-Fusion of Legal and Equitable Matters by Rotman, Leonard I. (author)
497(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
The “Fusion” of Law and Equity?: 
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Matters
Leonard I Rotman*
Equity, in its broad understanding, has long been a fundamental part of law. Its 
history may be traced through principles illustrated in the Old Testament and, in 
various formulations, through Ancient Greek and Roman legal constructs, as well as 
in Natural Law and Canon Law. While the historic presence of equity within various 
systems of law is unquestioned, the jurisdiction of equity within contemporary legal 
systems has been a matter of significant debate and confusion. Facilitating a better 
understanding of the contemporary role of equity requires knowledge of its meaning and 
the implications of the historic merger of legal and equitable jurisdictions. This paper 
establishes a framework for appreciating the contemporary challenges faced by equity by 
examining the Supreme Court of Canada’s analysis of the merger of legal and equitable 
jurisdictions in two major cases involving allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty: 
Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co and Hodgkinson v Simms. The inconsistent 
application of equitable principles in these cases demonstrates the court’s confusion over 
the effects of the historic merger of law and equity and offers a valuable perspective for 
the administration of justice in contemporary law.
* Purdy Crawford Chair in Business Law and Professor, Schulich School of 
Law, Dalhousie University.
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I. Introduction
Equity1 has long been a part of law, complementing its strength and ameliorating its deficiencies. Over its history, equity developed 
a number of key principles that advanced the law. One of these is the 
trust, which is often described as equity’s greatest invention.2 Another 
1. The use of the term “equity” herein refers to the larger philosophical 
jurisdiction under which various equitable jurisdictions and principles 
(such as the equitable, as opposed to legal, interest in land) exist. 
Where specific instances of equity are referred to in the text, they will 
be distinguished accordingly, such as by the use of the phrase “English 
Equity” to designate that specific jurisdiction and its principles.
2. See Frederick W Maitland, Equity: A Course Of Lectures, ed, by John 
Brunyate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936)(“[o]f all the 
exploits of Equity the largest and the most important is the invention 
and development of the Trust” at 23); see also Harold G Hanbury, “The 
Field of Modern Equity” (1929) 45:2 Law Quarterly Review 196 (“[t]
he trust, as developed through the use, is the mainspring of equity” at 
199); Roderick Pitt Meagher, William Montague Charles Gummow & 
John Robert Felix Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 3d (Sydney: 
Butterworths, 1992)(“the recognition, protection and development of 
uses and trusts [is] equity’s greatest contribution to the law ... ” at 5).
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is equity’s single most representative creation, the fiduciary obligation.3 
Over hundreds of years, these and other developments helped to solidify 
equity’s important place within the larger body of law it served to 
complement.4
Over time, the integration of equitable principles into the common 
law, including principles such as unconscionability and good faith 
in contract law and negligence in tort, has resulted in a narrowing of 
the historic gulf between law and equity. Adding this development to 
the merger of legal and equitable jurisdictions, or what has sometimes 
been described as the “fusion” of law and equity, has muddled the 
understanding of equity’s traditional function as “the spiritual and 
reforming influence of the law”.5 This is a particular concern in Canada 
and the United States, where there is a lack of substantive discussion 
and explication of the purpose and function of equitable principles in 
mainstream jurisprudence and academic commentary.6
3. Leonard I Rotman, Fiduciary Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 154 
[Rotman, Fiduciary Law]; Gino Dal Pont & Don Chalmers, Equity and 
Trusts in Australia and New Zealand, 2d (Sydney: Law Book Co, 2000)
(who describe the fiduciary concept as “arguably the premier equitable 
concept which illustrates equity’s jurisdiction” at 71); John D McCamus, 
“The Evolving Role of Fiduciary Obligation” in Meredith Lectures, The 
Continued Relevance of the Law of Obligations: Back to Basics (Montreal: 
Les Editions Yvon Blais, 2000)(“fiduciary obligation seems now to have 
assumed the traditional mantle and role of equity jurisprudence as a 
device for correcting defects in the common law” at 205).
4. As will be discussed further herein, equity was developed as a 
complementary jurisdiction to the common law that served to augment 
the latter and ameliorate its harshness and inflexibility.
5. William F Walsh, “Is Equity Decadent?” (1937) 22:4 Minnesota Law 
Review 479 (“[t]he latent power of equity [is] to shape and develop new 
law on a higher plane of reason and conscience, and with an increased 
effectiveness to meet human needs” at 494).
6. Certainly, substantive discussion of equity has been on the wane for much 
of the last century in North America, though some might argue that 
equity has faced significant challenges to its historic jurisdiction since 
the merging of legal and equitable jurisdictions in England through the 
Judicature Act, 1873 (UK), 36 & 37 Vict, c 66; and Judicature Act, 1875 
(UK), 38 & 39 Vict, c 77.
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Law’s movement closer to equity in areas such as contract, tort, 
and unjust enrichment has combined with a greater emphasis towards 
achieving enhanced certainty in law to hasten equity’s marginalization in 
contemporary jurisprudence.7 These developments have had deleterious 
effects on the understanding of the substantive jurisdiction of law and 
equity. When this desire for certainty is combined with the decreased 
emphasis on substantive equity within Canadian and American law 
schools,8 equitable doctrines such as fiduciary duty that emphasize 
abstract principles rather than more easily discernible and predictable 
rules have struggled to maintain their traditional roles.9 What has 
generally been ignored in this restructuring of the legal landscape is that, 
despite its struggle towards achieving certainty, the law actually benefits 
7. Notwithstanding the general lack of knowledge of equity and equitable 
doctrine, the maxims of equity appear to retain a curious currency in 
contemporary jurisprudence: see e.g. Jeff Berryman, “Equity’s Maxims as 
a Concept in Canadian Jurisprudence” (2012) 43:2 Ottawa Law Review 
165.
8. While it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when the abandonment of equity 
as a substantive part of the law school curriculum occurred, it would seem 
to have occurred within the last half century; see Louise Weinberg, “The 
New Meaning of Equity” (1977) 28:4 Journal of Legal Education 532 
at 536 (the author indicates that while in 1949, eight of 108 law schools 
responding to a survey answered that they had eliminated separate courses 
in equity, in a 1967 survey of all 115 law schools then-accredited by the 
Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”), equity, in some form, 
was a required first-year course in only 11 schools, a required upper-year 
course in a further 19 schools, and available as an elective in only 32 
schools); see also Louis F Del Duca, “Comment, Continuing Evaluation 
of Law School Curricula: An Initial Survey” (1968) 20:3 Journal of Legal 
Education 309; Lester B Orfield, “The Place of Equity in the Law School 
Curriculum” (1949) 2:1 Journal of Legal Education 26.
9. For greater discussion, see Leonard I Rotman, “Fiduciary Law’s ‘Holy 
Grail’: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence” 
(2011) 91:3 Boston University Law Review 921.
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from a certain amount of fogginess.10
This paper emphasizes that equity ought to be understood to have a 
continuing and substantive role in contemporary law and legal education. 
Equity is not only a method by which the rigours of the common law are 
tempered and its gaps filled, nor is it merely a competing system to the 
positive law. Rather, equity is more appropriately understood as a process 
by which positive law is brought closer to the human condition.11 It is a 
way of elevating the law and facilitating the achievement of justice in the 
10. This is becoming increasingly recognized in contemporary legal literature. 
See e.g. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the 
Occasional Virtues of Fog” (2010) 123:5 Harvard Law Review 1214 
(where the author disputes the conventional wisdom that celebrating the 
clarity and certainty of legal rules must necessarily correspond to devaluing 
the flexibility and adaptability of legal standards. Instead, she argues that 
“[b]y framing the prima facie unclarity and uncertainty of legal standards 
as a defect, the traditional picture ignores the salutary impact that 
superficial opacity may have on citizens’ moral deliberation and on robust 
democratic engagement with law” at 1214); note also Yuval Feldman & 
Shahar Lifshitz, “Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty” (2011) 74:2 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 133 (which “challenges the conventional 
view [that uncertainty in law is bad] and proclaims the advantages of legal 
uncertainty” at 134; and “properly used, uncertainty can dramatically 
enhance efficiency and fairness” at 174).
11. Gary Watt, Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009 )(“[e]quity is not Utopian, it simply reaches beyond 
the routines of law towards the particularities of the human condition” at 
243); see also Philip A Ryan, “Equity: System or Process?” (1956) 45:2 
Georgetown Law Journal 213 (“[e]quity is a process, but it is a process of 
a far broader and more important kind than procedure, even when this is 
taken in its widest possible sense. Equity viewed as a process accomplished 
the conversion of morality into law; procedure is merely the means of 
recognizing the conversion in a particular case ... ” at 222).
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broadest sense of the term12 while providing sound parameters for the 
exercise of judicial discretion. However, this historic role is threatened 
by misunderstandings of the implications of merging legal and equitable 
jurisdictions that remain in the present day. 
In the process of establishing a conceptual framework for 
understanding the merger of law and equity, this paper looks initially to 
equity’s historical and conceptual origins. Next, it examines the effect of 
the merging of legal and equitable jurisdictions, historically and by way 
of two contemporaneous cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co13 (“Canson”) and Hodgkinson v 
Simms14 (“Hodgkinson”). The paper then illustrates, by way of these cases, 
how similar fact patterns sharing a common feature15 may be resolved 
differently, depending on whether one views equity as being “fused” with 
12. See Howard L Oleck, “Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence” 
(1951) 20:1 Fordham Law Review 23 (“[e]quity, certainly in its historical 
moral sense, and hopefully in its administrative sense, is the principal 
technique thus far developed to make certain that law always will be 
readily adaptable for, and directed toward, the achievement of justice” at 
44); Watt, ibid (“[w]ithout equity, the law’s story becomes all rules and 
no justice” at 45; and “[e]quity does not set out to produce an ideally 
righteous system … but it sets out to make the system of regular law more 
just” at 102-103); see also Ryan, ibid (“[w]hat is necessary is to have some 
adequate grasp of Equity as a built-in dynamism necessary for progress 
in any system which purports to administer justice” at 217); Robert H 
Rogers, “A Lesson in Equity” (1915) 49:4 American Law Review 510 (“[l]
egal justice is the law’s attempt at approximate justice from the standpoint 
of social expediency … But the justice of equity, as originally intended 
and administered, was man’s best attempt to arrive at real justice regardless 
of law or rule” at 535).
13. (1991), 85 DLR (4th) 129 (SCC) [Canson]. 
14. (1994), 117 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC) [Hodgkinson].
15. In both of these cases, the damages claimed were not entirely related to 
the direct actions of the alleged wrongdoers, but were dependent upon the 
effects of secondary forces that were said to have flowed directly from the 
wrongdoers’ breach of duty. In both cases, the Supreme Court of Canada 
was also confronted with, inter alia, the application of common law versus 
equitable causation and the relevance of the principles of foreseeability, 
remoteness, and intervening act.
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the common law (and thereby having its principles being fully integrated 
with or subsumed under the common law) or simply merged with it 
(whereby equitable principles retain their theoretical and substantive 
distinctiveness from those of the common law). 
II. The Historical and Conceptual Origins of Equity
Despite equity’s historic role in developing greater justice for law, its 
continuation as the conscience of law has been potentially jeopardized 
by its uncertain application in contemporary jurisprudence.16 Early in 
the history of various legal systems, it was recognized that for law to be 
just, it had to balance broadly-worded and rigidly applied positive laws of 
general application with more case-specific and flexible legal applications 
that could respond to new and unique circumstances. The challenge of 
appealing to the general and the specific, being rigid, yet flexible, and 
simultaneously precise and open-ended meant that complementary 
systems were required to bring together these antagonistic goals. 
The idea of complementary legal jurisdictions helps to explain the 
historical purpose and function of equity. Equity works alongside the 
law, supporting it where it is deficient and enabling the law to adequately 
respond to the individual requirements of particular circumstances. It 
occupies a supplementary jurisdiction to the common law that props 
16. From a very early stage, conscience became one of the guiding principles 
of equity jurisdiction: see Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making, 7d 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)(“[i]f we look for one general principle 
which more than any other influenced equity as it was developed by the 
Chancery, we find it in a philosophical and theological conception of 
conscience” at 406); see also George Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of 
the Court of Chancery, vol 1 (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1846)(“... 
if any distinction was originally recognized as to the respective import 
of the terms Equity and Conscience, they soon became confounded, 
and a very considerable latitude was admitted in the application of the 
terms Equity and Conscience” at 412-413); Donovan WM Waters, “The 
Reception of Equity in the Supreme Court of Canada (1875-2000)” 
(2001) 80:1 Canadian Bar Review 620 (“[e]quity is ‘conscience’ – this is 
its whole raison d’etre, doctrinal in character though it be ... ” at 630, and 
“[e]quity was and is the voice of conscience” at 625). 
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up and improves the latter without being inferior to it or lesser in 
importance.17 The development and situation-specific application of 
equitable principles humanized and contextualized the law’s otherwise 
antiseptic nature, which made the law more just.18 In accomplishing these 
diverse tasks, equity did not replace the common law, but maintained a 
conceptual separation from it, all the while harmonizing law with the 
needs and requirements of evolving social structures and relationships. 
As a supplemental jurisdiction to the common law, equity could 
not function independently of the former; as Maitland famously said, 
equity, without the common law, would have been “a castle in the air”.19 
It is equally important, however, to understand that the common law, 
without equity, would have been “barbarous, unjust [and] absurd”.20 
Today, equity is clearly “part of the warp and woof of our substantive 
law”,21 but the precise role it plays in contemporary law is often unclear. 
Despite the symbiotic relationship between law and equity, common 
law practitioners were concerned about the competition that equity 
17. Acknowledging the supplementary jurisdiction of equity does not, 
however, entail, that equity is either inferior to or lesser in importance 
than the common law. Rather, equity is not needed where the law is 
suitable or sufficient to address the issue in question, but augments it or 
replaces it where it is silent or deficient; see the discussion of this issue 
below; see Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2)(1974), 1 Ch 269 (Eng) at 322; 
Sidney E Smith, “The Stage of Equity” (1933) 11:5 Canadian Bar Review 
308 (“[e]quitable rights were not to supplant common law rights, and, 
in most cases, equitable rights were predicated upon the very existence 
of common law rights” at 312, and “[e]quity, as understood in English 
law, was not a self-sufficient system; at every point, it presupposed the 
existence of the common law” at 313).
18. See the references, supra note 12. 
19. Maitland, supra note 2 at 19. 
20. See also Watt, supra note 11 (“[t]he law provides just one among many 
stories of justice. If the law story is to convince us, it must include the 
character of equity. Without equity, the law’s story becomes all rules and 
no justice” at 45); see also John Gardner, “The Virtue of Justice and the 
Character of Law” (2000) 53:1 Current Legal Problems 1 at 18.
21. Douglas Laycock, “The Triumph of Equity” (1993) 56:3 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 53 at 71.
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posed for the common law prior to the merging of legal and equitable 
jurisdictions. This provided them with incentive to denigrate equitable 
principles or to critique equity practice.22 Part of the historic discontent 
with equity also arose from ideological conflicts and procedural issues 
that created a legacy of stalled jurisprudence in the Court of Chancery.23
During the time the common law and equity were administered in 
separate courts, with separate rules and bases of relief pertaining to each, 
there was little or no reciprocity between them. This created a situation 
whereby plaintiffs had to choose which forum to air their disputes.24 
This was not always a straightforward matter about what jurisdiction 
was appropriate for their claims. Indeed, even lawyers had a difficult 
time discerning the appropriate forum to entertain claims. Judges were 
not always helpful either; their desire to solidify claims to jurisdiction 
22. Frederick Pollock, “The Transformation of Equity” in Paul Vinogradoff, 
ed, Essays in Legal History (London: Oxford University Press, 1913)(“[c]
omplaints ... were for the most part, if not altogether, made or instigated 
by practitioners of the common law who were aggrieved by the growing 
competition of the Chancery” at 293). 
23. Walter Ashburner, Principles of Equity (London: Butterworth & Co, 
1902) at 14-17 (Ashburner speaks of continual skirmishes between 
the jurisdictions during the reign of Elizabeth I. Attempts to introduce 
equitable concepts into common law – and thereby undermine the 
jurisdiction of English Equity); see also Spence, supra note 16 at 576; in 
a more contemporary American setting, see Lyman Johnson, “Delaware’s 
Non-Waivable Duties” (2011) 91:2 Boston University Law Review 701 
(“[e]quity in the Western legal tradition has always coexisted somewhat 
uneasily with law, threatening as it does to ‘subvert’ and destabilize legal 
principles” at 709, citing Margaret Halliwell, Equity and Good Conscience 
in a Contemporary Context (London: Old Bailey Press, 1997), who states 
that “[f ]undamental misconceptions of equity abound … because of 
a persistent refusal to acknowledge that equity is, by its very nature, 
subversive of the law” at 6).
24. Laycock, supra note 21 (“[b]efore the merger, the choice between equity 
and law entailed an all-or-nothing choice between all the characteristics of 
each system: discretion or formalism, specific or substitutionary remedies, 
personal decrees or impersonal judgments, enforcement by the contempt 
power or by execution and garnishment, bench trial or jury trial, and the 
availability or unavailability of preliminary relief ” at 78). 
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over a matter sometimes led to expansive interpretations that were not 
always consistent or logical. Inefficiency and delay often ensued, but 
these troubles were dispensed with by the merging, or fusion, of legal 
and equitable jurisdictions.25
III. Equity and “Fusion”
Many of the difficulties posed by the separate existence of courts of law 
and equity were ultimately removed by the administrative merging of 
those jurisdictions. At that point, the separate jurisdiction of equity was 
abolished and every judge of the new, combined court of law and equity 
was bound to recognize and give effect to all legal and equitable rights, 
obligations, and defences. While the remnants of Chancery practice, 
along with the various abuses said to have occurred within its walls, were 
25. Ibid (“[t]he merger of law and equity ought to mean that the choice 
between law and equity is no longer all-or-nothing” at 78); while the 
United Kingdom abolished the separate jurisdictions of law and equity 
through the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, supra note 6, other 
countries maintained separations between the common law and equity for 
various lengths of time. In Canada, most provinces did not have separate 
jurisdictions for law and equity because the majority of them were formed 
after the UK Judicature Acts were promulgated. Quebec was an exception 
to this situation because of its use of civil law. The few provinces that did 
have separate jurisdictions for law and equity – Ontario, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island – adopted the idea of concurrent 
jurisdictions over time: New Brunswick in 1854, Nova Scotia in 1856, 
Prince Edward Island in 1873, and Ontario in 1881: see Waters, supra 
note 16 at 623. Ontario only had a Court of Chancery from 1837; 
however, as seen in Smith, supra note 17 even though “... [t]here was no 
Chancery Court there during that period ... there is no reason to believe 
that any great confusion resulted. What we do find, however, is that the 
judges of the common law Courts made a conscious effort to ameliorate 
the rigours of the common law and to do equity” at 313; in the United 
States, the procedural separation of law and equity was abolished under 
most state rules of civil procedure at various stages and, federally, through 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938: see Ralph A Newman, 
Equity and Law: A Comparative Study (New York: Oceana Publications, 
1961) at 50-51. An obvious exception to this is the state of Delaware, 
which maintains a Court of Chancery to the present day.
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abandoned, the doctrines of equity that were formulated and refined in 
Chancery did not lose their validity with the shuttering of that court. 
Watt expressly recognizes this important distinction:
[w]e do not mourn the passing of the old Court of Chancery with all the evils 
it perpetuated … but we should not make the mistake of sealing its treasure 
in the tomb. The treasure of chancery is a living language; a vital repository of 
checks and balances that maintain the law’s just operation in the zone between 
too much rigour and too much flexibility … [A] legal language of equity is 
a thriving legacy of the Court of Chancery. Chancery language still has the 
capacity to inform the art of bending rules without breaking them and the 
capacity to reform the law without deforming it.26
Despite the merging of law and equity, the continuing role of equity post-
merger remained contentious. Lionel Smith has described the distinction in 
views over the merger of law and equity as “equity pragmatism” and “equity 
purism”.27 In his view, the equity pragmatist “sees the legacy of equity as 
an historical fact that merely complicates the correct understanding of the 
modern law”.28 To the equity pragmatist, the common law and equity are 
not watertight compartments, but part of the “tapestry of law” and can 
be drawn upon freely or even in combination. The equity purist, on the 
other hand, “believes in the continuing distinctness of equitable reasoning, 
equitable doctrines, equitable traditions”.29 To the equity purist, equity 
should never be infused with common law notions.30 The fact of the 
jurisdictional merger of law and equity did not change the various reasons 
for creating equity in the first place nor make its doctrines and remedies 
26. Watt, supra note 11 at 131.
27. Lionel Smith, “Unravelling Proprietary Restitution” (2004) 40:3 
Canadian Business Law Journal 317 [L Smith, “Unravelling”]; see 
also Lionel Smith, Book Reviews of Equitable Damages by Peter M 
McDermott; Equity: Issues and Trends by Malcom Cope, ed; Commercial 
Equity: Fiduciary Relationships by John Glover, (1996) 75:2 Canadian Bar 
Review 388.
28. L Smith, “Unravelling”, supra note 27 at 317. 
29. Ibid.
30. See also Laycock, supra note 21 (in a similar vein, Laycock speaks about a 
“segregationist spirit” in his paper, in which equity is to be preserved as a 
separate and distinct body from the common law, with the preservation of 
the former’s own, separate traditions from those of law at 54).
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any more broadly available than previously. It did, however, eliminate the 
uncertainty over which court to file a claim in and ended the wrongful 
duplication of claims in both courts.
Laycock is one prominent scholar who has argued in favour of the 
full and total integration of law and equity in a manner consistent with 
Smith’s “equity pragmatist”: 
these debates are no longer about law and equity; they are simply debates 
about our law. We should not view every incremental expansion of a feature 
once associated with common law or equity as an incremental victory for 
common law or equity. The one thing we may be sure of is that the legal or 
equitable origin of the feature does not motivate the decision. Equity is fully 
accepted; legal and equitable features compete on a level playing field, largely 
commingled and sometimes indistinguishable. The argument about law and 
equity is over; now we just argue what the rules ought to be on grounds that 
are substantive, political, or jurisprudential, but not on the grounds of the 
subordinate status of equity.31
To Laycock, other than where references to equity have been codified, 
“law-equity arguments are always and exclusively a misleading 
distraction”.32 This sentiment may also be observed in Justice Stevenson’s 
judgment in Canson, where he warned that “talk of fusing law and equity, 
only results in confusing and confounding the law”.33
 Although this process of simplifying the law is a positive move, 
it does not require, nor should it require, the abandoning of principle. 
The fashioning of doctrine — and the corresponding rights and remedies 
flowing from it — is based in principle and should only be departed 
from on an equally principled basis rather than being rooted in mere 
practicality. Remedies are properly fashioned in relation to something; 
they ought not be developed for mere convenience or other equally 
inappropriate reasons. Remedies ought to always follow the law and be 
appropriate to the harm caused or loss suffered.
31. Ibid at 81. 
32. Ibid at 82. 
33. Canson, supra note 13 at 165. See also Laycock, supra note 21 (“[t]o the 
extent that debate persists over discretion or other failures associated with 
equity, it is a general debate about the best way to run a legal system. The 
debate is not about the boundary between law and equity, and it distorts 
analysis to continue thinking in terms of law and equity” at 54).
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In contrast to the equity pragmatist, who tends to focus only on 
outcomes, the equity purist focuses on doctrine and the applicability or 
appropriateness of any change or modification of principles or tenets of 
equity to assess changes to the application of equitable principles. These 
purists have stressed that the merging of legal and equitable jurisdictions 
is simply administrative and procedural in effect, bringing together 
historic law and equity jurisdictions in the same court, but maintaining 
the ideological distinctions between them. For example, Roscoe Pound 
has maintained that:
[a]lthough in all but five of our jurisdictions law and equity are administered 
by the same court, and often by the same judge, and in a majority of our 
jurisdictions they may be and are administered in the same proceeding, we still 
think and teach, and courts still judge, as if they were distinct jurisdictions.34
Similarly, as Master of the Rolls Sir George Jessel famously said in Salt v 
Cooper:
[i]t is stated very plainly that the main object of the [Judicature] Act was to 
assimilate the transaction of equity business and Common Law business by 
different Courts of Judicature. It has been sometimes inaccurately called “the 
fusion of Law and Equity”; but it was not any fusion, or anything of the kind; 
it was the vesting in one tribunal the administration of Law and Equity in 
every cause, action, or dispute which should come before that tribunal. That 
was the meaning of the Act.35
34. Roscoe Pound, “Taught Law” (1912) 3:4 American Law School Review 
164 at 168; see also Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, supra note 2  
(“[t]here was nothing in the Judicature Act which attempted to codify 
law and equity as one subject matter or which severed the roots of the 
conceptual distinctions between law and equity. The term ‘fusion’ used 
frequently in discussion at that time referred to the establishment of the 
new court with, by virtue of s 26, the jurisdiction of the old courts … It 
did not describe some new body of law which was neither law nor equity, 
and it was not susceptible of a construction that in any given case the new 
court had jurisdiction to produce a result which could never have been 
reached in any one or more of the old courts” at 45).
35. (1880), 16 Ch D 544 (Eng) at 549; see also Di Guilo v Boland (1958), 
13 DLR (2d) 510 (Ont CA )(where Justice Morden states that “[t]he 
Judicature Act did not merge law and equity, but only the Courts of law 
and equity. A litigant cannot succeed in a purely common law claim 
relying upon equitable grounds” at 514).
510 
 
Rotman, The “Fusion” of Law and Equity?
There is no reason why the historical and necessary tenets of equity 
ought to have been altered or abandoned because of an administrative 
or procedural change or without significant and substantive reasons 
for doing so. Streamlining procedure or consolidating courts does not 
provide adequate reason or explanation for such a departure from long-
standing practices. Although discussion about the fusion of law and 
equity has generated heated debate, to ignore that debate (as Laycock and 
Stevenson J suggest, above) because of, inter alia: (i) the commingling 
of legal and equitable principles, as, for example, with the doctrine of 
unconscionability in contract law;36 (ii) the sense that equity “won” the 
battle, so there is no need to revisit it37 or; (iii) that there is the potential 
to cause confusion by raising such arguments, ignores fundamental 
implications about the merging of the two jurisdictions. 
While avoiding law-equity jurisdictional debates because of their 
potential to cause confusion may well be expeditious, such avoidance 
trades off a necessary element of judicial inquiry in order to simplify 
the process of arriving at a final determination of the matter in issue. 
In doing so, it also potentially ignores fundamental implications about 
the merging of the two jurisdictions in order to expedite a resolution 
that may well bring into question the authority and legitimacy of that 
resolution.
IV. “Fusion” and the Supreme Court of Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada has weighed in on the debate over “equity 
and fusion” in two significant cases: Canson38 and Hodgkinson.39 While 
these cases do not paint a wholly uniform picture of the Supreme Court’s 
position on the fusion debate, they indicate that court’s recognition of 
equitable doctrines as a significant, if not always consistently understood, 
36. As stated by Laycock, supra note 21 at 81.
37. Ibid (“[t]he distinctive traditions of equity now pervade the legal system. 
The war between law and equity is over. Equity won … We should invoke 
equity just as we invoke law, without explanation or apology and without 
a preliminary showing that this is a case for equity” at 53-54). 
38. Canson, supra note 13.
39. Hodgkinson, supra note 14.
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component of Canadian law.
A.  Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co
In Canson, the appellants Canson Enterprises Ltd (“Canson”) and 
Fealty Enterprises Ltd (“Fealty”) and the respondent Peregrine Ventures 
Inc (“Peregrine”) concluded an agreement to purchase and develop a 
property as a joint venture on the recommendation of the respondent, 
Treit. However, Treit had surreptitiously arranged a flip of the property 
in question, resulting in the developers paying $115,000 more for the 
property than necessary. Treit then split that “secret profit” with a third 
party. Peregrine knew about the flip, but did not disclose its existence 
to Canson and Fealty. The same lawyer, Wollen, acted as solicitor on all 
these transactions, including the final purchase by Canson, Fealty, and 
Peregrine. To further conceal the flip and secret profit from Canson and 
Fealty, the transaction in question was documented as a transfer from the 
original vendor directly to the purchasers. 
Following the conclusion of the sale of the land, the appellants 
proceeded with their development, but the warehouse they built sank 
as a result of negligence by the soil engineers they had hired to analyze 
the property. The appellants initiated proceedings and subsequently won 
judgments against the soil engineers and pile-driving company for the 
damage caused to the warehouse. However, neither the soil engineers nor 
the pile-driving company had sufficient assets to satisfy the full amount 
owed. Ultimately, the mortgage company that had financed the sale and 
development of the property foreclosed, resulting in a shortfall of more 
than $1 million to the appellants. 
The appellants subsequently commenced an action against Peregrine, 
Wollen, and his law firm Boughton & Co. The agreed-upon statement 
of facts indicated that “but for” the respondents’ failure to disclose the 
land flip and the secret profit it generated, the appellants would not have 
purchased the property and, therefore, would not have been in a position 
to suffer the losses from its development caused by the negligence of 
the soil engineers and pile-driving company. The claim thus attempted 
to foist ultimate liability upon the respondents for initiating the chain 
of events that caused the warehouse to sink, notwithstanding that they 
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neither hired nor had authority over the soil engineers and pile-driving 
company. The claim’s attempt to circumvent principles of, inter alia, 
causation, remoteness, and foreseeability required that it be founded in 
an equitable cause of action rather than on a common law basis. This 
choice of law issue became a particular focus upon the case’s appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
In his majority judgment in Canson, Justice La Forest appropriately 
describes the appellants’ claim as one which would have resulted in no 
recovery had it been founded in a common law cause of action:
[i]f the action was one founded on breach of contract, it would be necessary 
to consider whether the damages suffered were within the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties. If the action was founded in negligence, it would 
be proper to apply principles of remoteness, foreseeability and intervening 
cause. And if the action was one for deceit or fraud, not only foreseeable but 
unforeseeable damages flowing from the deceit would be awarded, stopping, 
however, where the chain of causation was broken ... If the action were brought 
on any of these bases, then, the appellants could not recover for the very 
substantial damages that arose from the actions of the engineering firm and 
the pile-driving company.40
Despite the existence of precedent holding that these considerations did 
not apply to claims of breach of fiduciary duty,41 the ability to circumvent 
these matters did not sit well with La Forest J. As he states, “barring 
different policy considerations underlying one action or the other, I 
see no reason why the same basic claim, whether framed in terms of a 
common law action or an equitable remedy, should give rise to different 
levels of redress”.42
While La Forest J accepts that the appellants were entitled to 
40. Canson, supra note 13 at 137.
41. Guerin v The Queen (1984), 13 DLR (4th) 321 (SCC).
42. Canson, supra note 13 at 148; see also Michael Tilbury, “Fallacy or 
Furphy?: Fusion in a Judicature World” (2003) 26:2 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 357 at 370 (where he states that those who 
favour the substantive fusion of common law and equity or who believe 
that the Judicature Acts already created such an effect – whom he describes 
as “fusionists” – believe that a strong argument in favour of substantive 
fusion exists precisely so that like cases will be treated alike).
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“choose the remedy most advantageous to them”43 and that the 
respondents breached fiduciary duties owed to the appellants, his 
judgment indicates that he remains unconvinced that sufficiently 
different policy considerations existed to warrant granting equitable relief 
without accounting for foreseeability, intervening act, or remoteness. 
Consequently, his judgment limits the appellants’ claim to losses directly 
attributable to Wollen’s failure to disclose the property flip and not from 
the sunken warehouse development. The latter, he insists, were too far 
removed from the breach of fiduciary duty resulting from Wollen’s failure 
to disclose the property flip and thus not appropriately attributable to the 
respondents.
In her minority judgment in Canson, Justice McLachlin, as she 
then was, correctly recognizes that different policy considerations apply 
to equitable compensation versus common law damages. Although she 
finds, in accordance with Caffrey v Darby44, that a fiduciary in breach 
of duty may be liable for the actions of third parties that are linked to 
the breach, she determines that the appellants’ loss was not the result 
of Wollen’s breach of duty, but of decisions made by the appellants 
and the individuals they hired. As she explains, “[i]t is fairer that losses 
arising from construction on the property after the purchase be borne by 
those who assume responsibility for the construction rather than by the 
solicitor who acted in the purchase transaction”.45
Stevenson J’s judgment substantially agrees with La Forest J’s 
reasoning in Canson, but differs on the issues of equitable compensation 
and the “fusion” of law and equity. Regarding the former, Stevenson J 
states that:
... a court of equity, applying principles of fairness, would and should draw the 
line at calling upon the fiduciary to compensate for losses arising as a result 
of the unanticipated neglect of the engineers and pile-driving contractor. The 
fiduciary had nothing to do with their selection, their control, their contractual 
or bonding obligations. ... [T]hese losses are too remote, not in the sense of 
failing the “but for” test, but in being so unrelated and independent that they 
43. Canson, supra note 13 at 140.
44. (1801), 31 ER 1159 (Ch) [Caffrey].
45. Canson, supra note 13 at 164.
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should not, in fairness, be attributed to the defendant’s breach of duty.46
Stevenson J also concludes that the merger of law and equity has nothing 
to do with the determination of liability in Canson.47
La Forest J’s assertion that a common law or equitable claim 
ought to give rise to the same level of redress “barring different policy 
considerations underlying one action or the other” fails to recognize, 
as McLachlin J does in her judgment, that there are different policy 
considerations underlying equitable actions like breach of fiduciary 
duty than those corresponding to common law claims. While “but 
for”, “cause-in-fact”, or “sine qua non” causation generally satisfies the 
requirements of equity, the common law requires a finding of materiality 
or substantial cause to link the impugned activity with the harm to the 
plaintiff.48 To conflate the various requirements existing in common 
law and equity or to equate equitable compensation and common law 
damages ignores those jurisdictions’49 separate and distinct historical and 
doctrinal development. Like La Forest J, McLachlin J does not hold the 
respondents liable for the full amount of the loss suffered; her conclusion, 
like his, stems from an unwillingness to find that Wollen’s liability would 
have extended to the appellants’ development of the property if rooted 
in fiduciary duty, but not if it was rooted in contract or tort. However, in 
arriving at the same conclusion, she remains faithful to the historic and 
doctrinal distinctions of the common law and equity.
The distinctions in common law and equitable approaches to 
causation that proved to be so prominent in the result in Canson, as 
well as in distinguishing the judgments of La Forest and McLachlin JJ, 
are never reconciled in that case. Interestingly, they arise again in the 
46. Ibid at 165.
47. Ibid (“[a] court of equity might not find some losses to be caused by a 
plaintiff rather than a defendant, and to be too remote in that sense, but it 
would not do so because of the fusion of law and equity” at 166).
48. See e.g. Andrew Tipping, “Causation at Law and in Equity: Do We Have 
Fusion?” (2000) 7:3 Canterbury Law Review 443 at 445.
49. For greater clarity, the use of the word “jurisdiction” here is not intended 
to indicate anything other than the separate conceptual and doctrinal 
bases of the common law and equity. 
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Supreme Court of Canada’s subsequent judgment in Hodgkinson. In 
Hodgkinson, however, the implications of those distinctions are not seen 
to be problematic as they were held to be in Canson. Additionally, they are 
less clearly visible in the judgments in that latter case, notwithstanding 
that they figure equally prominently in the disposition in Hodgkinson. 
B.  Hodgkinson v Simms
In the Hodgkinson case, Hodgkinson, a stockbroker seeking advice on tax 
sheltering, hired Simms, an accountant who specialized in providing such 
advice. Hodgkinson advised Simms that he wanted to defer tax through 
the acquisition of stable, long-term investments. Simms suggested 
investing in multi-unit residential buildings (“MURBs”), which were 
conservative real estate investments according to conventional wisdom 
at the time. Hodgkinson then purchased four MURBs recommended by 
Simms. However, when the real estate market later experienced a sharp 
decline, Hodgkinson lost virtually all of his investments in the MURBs.
Hodgkinson subsequently discovered that Simms and his firm had 
received fees and payments regarding three of the MURB developments 
he had invested in. At no time had Simms disclosed these payments or 
that he had provided advice to the MURB developers to make their 
projects more desirable tax sheltering investments.50 Hodgkinson then 
commenced legal action against Simms for negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty. As a stockbroker who was wary of the high risk world 
of promoters, Hodgkinson trusted Simms’ advice and stressed in his 
pleadings that had he known of Simms’ relationship with the MURB 
developer, he would never have invested in the MURBs in question.51
50. During the time period in question, Simms billed the developers an 
amount representing one-sixth of his firm’s total billable hours.
51. For the purposes of the Hodgkinson judgment and fiduciary law generally, 
whether or not Hodgkinson would have invested in some other MURBs 
and still lost his money as a result of the decline in the real estate market is 
an irrelevant consideration based on the principle espoused in Brickenden 
v London Loan & Savings Co (1934), 3 DLR 465 (SCC) [Brickenden]; see 
the discussion of Brickenden’s implications in Rotman, Fiduciary Law, 
supra note 3 at 659-70.
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La Forest J’s majority judgment in Hodgkinson places significant 
emphasis upon the integrity of the relationship in Hodgkinson, not simply 
upon Hodgkinson’s personal vulnerability created by his individual 
interaction with Simms. La Forest J’s judgment focuses more upon the 
broader purpose of protecting important social and economic relations 
of dependency and vulnerability than in addressing the particular 
circumstances that existed between Hodgkinson and Simms. It is in the 
context of the former that La Forest J speaks of the “social importance of 
the fiduciary principle”52 and emphasizes that “the law has recognized the 
importance of instilling in our social institutions and enterprises some 
recognition that not all relationships are characterized by a dynamic 
of mutual autonomy, and that the marketplace cannot always set the 
rules”.53
La Forest J also pays particular attention to the policy considerations 
that inform fiduciary law. This is indicated by his statement that “[t]
he desire to protect and reinforce the integrity of social institutions 
and enterprises is prevalent throughout fiduciary law”.54 La Forest J 
emphasizes that “[b]y enforcing a duty of honesty and good faith, the 
courts are able to regulate an activity that is of great value to commerce and 
society generally”.55 This broader focus, which is characteristic of equity, 
is conspicuously absent in Canson.56 However, La Forest J’s judgment 
in Hodgkinson maintains the position he put forward in Canson that a 
plaintiff ought not be entitled to greater relief by choosing an equitable 
as opposed to common law cause of action.
52. Hodgkinson, supra note 14 at 185.
53. Ibid at 186.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid at 184.
56. While some might argue that it is the result of the commercial interaction 
in Canson as opposed to the advisory relationship in Hodgkinson, recall 
that the key issue in Canson is the duty owed by the solicitor, Wollen, 
to the appellants as a result of his failure to act in their best interests as 
their fiduciary by not disclosing the existence of the real estate flip. Thus 
Canson, like Hodgkinson, also involves the duties owed by professionals to 
their clients, so there is, in fact, no such distinction in the nature of the 
duties contemplated in both cases.
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Justices Sopinka and McLachlin J’s dissenting judgment in Hodgkinson 
disagrees with La Forest J’s finding that a fiduciary relationship existed 
between Hodgkinson and Simms. They also state that literal “but for” 
causation had been rejected in British, Canadian, and United States case 
law for both common law and equitable claims;57 more specifically, they 
rely on the fact that the Canson judgment had found that “the results of 
supervening events beyond the control of the defendant are not justly 
visited upon him/her in assessing damages, even in the context of the 
breach of an equitable duty”.58 For this reason, they disagree with the 
result found by La Forest J, concluding instead that Simms ought not be 
held liable for Hodgkinson’s losses.
C.  Analysis
In Canson, both the majority and minority judgments insist that the 
respondents’ breach of duty — failing to disclose the property flip — is 
insufficiently material and too remote from the damages emanating from 
the sunken warehouse development — which was directly caused by the 
negligence of the soil engineers and pile-driving company — to result 
in the respondents’ liability for the latter. Curiously, no similar causal 
problem was found to exist in the majority judgment in Hodgkinson, 
where Simms’ failure to disclose his conflict of interest in the MURBs he 
recommended to Hodgkinson founded his liability for the loss in value of 
the MURBs directly caused by the real estate market downturn. 
Despite emphasizing the importance of the distinction between 
Canson and Hodgkinson, La Forest J does not truly explain why a 
distinction exists between the two similar situations arising in those 
cases. In both cases, a failure to disclose a conflict of interest results in 
a finding of breach of fiduciary duty. Equally, in both cases a conflict of 
interest established the scenario for a second, causally unrelated, event 
that resulted in greater losses suffered than those emanating from the 
conflicts of interest. Where the distinction between the judgments in the 
two cases lies is in how far liability for a breach of fiduciary duty extends 
57. Hodgkinson, supra note 14 at 223.
58. Ibid at 224.
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vis-à-vis the totality of losses suffered. In Canson, liability does not extend 
beyond the breach itself, which limits it to the increase in the purchase 
price of the property emanating from the flip and excludes losses from 
the warehouse development. Yet, in Hodgkinson, liability extends to 
the loss in value of the MURBs stemming from the market downturn, 
notwithstanding the lack of direct correlation between Simms’ breach of 
duty and the market collapse. 
La Forest J fails to indicate why the actions of the soil engineers and 
pile-driving company in Canson constitute an intervening act sufficient 
to break the chain of causation initiated by Wollen’s lack of disclosure, 
whereas the results of the downturn in the real estate market, which was 
equally beyond Simms’ control in Hodgkinson, remained causally tied 
to Simms’ conflict of interest notwithstanding that that conflict neither 
caused nor otherwise influenced the real estate market crash. La Forest J 
insists in Hodgkinson that “[f ]rom a policy perspective it is simply unjust 
to place the risk of market fluctuations on a plaintiff who would not 
have entered into a given transaction but for the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct”.59 Regarded in isolation, that conclusion may be deemed 
plausible, if not valid. What goes unexplained is why it is not equally 
unjust to place the risk of market fluctuations on Simms, since he had no 
greater control over the effects of the market than Hodgkinson did? La 
Forest J does not address this point.
Meanwhile, in Canson, both La Forest and McLachlin JJ deem 
it improper to hold the respondents liable for damages caused by the 
negligence of the soil engineers and pile-driving company when they 
neither hired those companies nor had any connection to or authority 
over them. However, La Forest J does not indicate why, in Canson, it is 
not unjust to place the risk of unforeseen subsequent events tied to the 
development of the property on Canson and Fealty when they testified 
that they would not have closed the purchase of the property — and 
thus would not have been in a position to have pursued the warehouse 
development and suffered the losses associated with that situation — had 
the increased purchase price caused by the real estate flip been disclosed.
59. Ibid at 207. 
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Indeed, if one attempts to be consistent in the disposition of the 
Canson and Hodgkinson cases, then either of two scenarios ought 
to have occurred. To be consistent with the determination in Canson 
and the limitation of liability for breach of fiduciary duty, the result in 
Hodgkinson ought not have held Simms responsible for the decreased 
value of the MURBs, insofar as the fall in the real estate market was not 
causally linked to Simms failure to disclose his conflict of interest. In 
that situation, Hodgkinson’s recovery should have been limited to the 
amount of the commissions paid to Simms from his purchase of the 
MURBs in question. If, however, the appropriate determination was that 
from the majority’s judgment in Hodgkinson, then the result in Canson 
ought to have entitled Canson and Fealty to recover the entirety of their 
losses suffered from the warehouse development, insofar as they would 
not have suffered those losses had Wollen either: (a) not breached his 
fiduciary duty, or; (b) disclosed the existence of his breach. Just as the 
majority found in Hodgkinson that Mr. Hodgkinson would not have 
purchased the MURBs and thus suffered the losses emanating from the 
downturn in the real estate market had he known of Simms’ dishonesty, 
Canson and Fealty claimed they would not have purchased the land in 
question — and resultantly not be: (i) in a position to develop the land; 
(ii) hire the negligent soil engineers and pile-driving company, and; (iii) 
have the warehouse sink, resulting in loss — had they known of the real 
estate flip. 
La Forest J correctly asserts that Simms’ breach of duty in Hodgkinson 
“goes to the heart of the duty of loyalty that lies at the core of the fiduciary 
principle”.60 Yet, could the same not be said of the breach of duty by the 
solicitor, Wollen, to his clients, the purchasers/developers in Canson? The 
distinction is made more curious by the fact that Simms’ problematic 
action was his failure to disclose his conflict of interest, not that he failed 
to adequately perform his professional advisory function, whereas in 
Canson, Wollen neither adequately discharged his professional duties nor 
disclosed his conflict of interest in concealing the flip and pocketing fees 
from the appellants from transactions that were actually detrimental to 
60. Ibid at 208.
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their interests.
Holding Simms responsible for the market’s effects on the MURBs 
appears to be based on equity’s jurisdiction over conscience. If this is so, 
one may legitimately ask why the same rationale does not also justify 
placing the risk of misfortune resulting from the warehouse development 
in Canson on the respondents, who also acted against conscience by 
orchestrating and failing to disclose the real estate flip? By acting in 
breach of duty, the respondents in Canson, like Simms in Hodgkinson, 
ought to incur liability on the basis of the precedent in Caffrey v Darby, 
which McLachlin J relies upon in her judgment in Canson. There the 
court states:
... if they have been already guilty of negligence, they must be responsible for 
any loss in any way to that property: for whatever may be the immediate cause, 
the property would not have been in a situation to sustain that loss, if it had 
not been for their negligence. If they had taken possession of the property, 
it would not have been in his possession. If the loss had happened by fire, 
lightning, or any other accident, that would not be an excuse for them, if guilty 
of [the] previous negligence. That was their fault.61
This principle in Caffrey v Darby explains Simms’ liability for Hodgkinson’s 
losses, notwithstanding that the direct cause of the loss was the bottom 
falling out of the real estate market rather than from any direct result of 
action taken by Simms. A wrong-acting fiduciary takes the world as he or 
she finds it.62 Thus, the fiduciary in breach of duty becomes liable for all 
tangibly related occurrences arising subsequent to the wrongful action, 
including the actions of third parties or the effects of catastrophic events 
61. Caffrey, supra note 44 at 1162.
62. See Joshua Getzler, “Equitable Compensation and the Regulation of 
Fiduciary Relationship” in Peter Birks & Francis Rose, eds, Restitution and 
Equity, Volume 1: Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (London: 
Mansfield Press, 2000)(“[t]he negligent trustee must take the world as 
he finds it, such that unforeseeable real-world events in the chain of 
causation initiated by the breach cannot establish remoteness as a defence” 
at 240). While Getzler questions the need for such a strict standard 
in contemporary jurisprudence, his statement that “[t]he severe test is 
instituted primarily to put maximum pressure on trustees to uphold their 
trust, and is not really an attempt to fix causation rules precisely” indicates 
a valid reason, and continued need, for its existence at 240).
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that are linked to the breach.63 Simms caused Hodgkinson to purchase 
MURBs in which the former had a conflict of interest. In doing so, 
Simms set a scenario into motion that left Hodgkinson susceptible to 
the ebbs and flows of the real estate market. From that point, he became 
responsible for whatever transpired; the implication of Caffrey v Darby is 
clear.
Playing out that same principle from Caffrey v Darby in the Canson 
case, then, ought to have held the respondents liable for the full amount 
of the losses suffered by Canson and Fealty, including the losses from the 
botched warehouse development. The explanation for such a result, as 
drawn from the precedent in Caffrey v Darby, is that Wollen would be 
assumed to undertake financial responsibility for any losses reasonably, 
logically, or sequentially tied to events set into motion by his breach of 
duty. That would include anything tied to the development of the land, 
including the ill-fated warehouse project, because Wollen’s breach was 
an intimate, albeit secret, part of the transaction by which Canson and 
Fealty acquired the land upon which they constructed the warehouse. 
Without that transaction, they would not have been in a position to 
develop the warehouse or to suffer the losses from that development, 
63. Note McLachlin J’s (as she then was) reliance on Canson, supra note 
13, in Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd (1969), 2 QB 158 (CA (Eng))
(in Doyle, Lord Denning MR states “[t]he defendant is bound to make 
reparation for all the actual damages directly flowing from the fraudulent 
inducement. The person who has been defrauded is entitled to say; ‘I 
would not have entered into this bargain at all but for your representation. 
Owing to your fraud, I have not only lost all the money I paid you, but, 
what is more, I have been put to a large amount of extra expense as well 
and suffered this or that extra damages’” at 167. McLachlin J added in 
Canson, supra note 13 (that “it does not lie in the mouth of a fiduciary 
who has assumed the special responsibility of trust to say the loss could 
not reasonably have been foreseen” at 161).
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notwithstanding that the losses were directly caused by third parties.64
When viewed this way, the situation in Hodgkinson is, effectively, no 
different than that in Canson, save for the fact that the direct responsibility 
for the loss to the appellants in the latter was not an intangible 
phenomenon like the market, but, rather, the actions of people.65 While 
La Forest J correctly states that “[i]n Canson the defendant solicitor did 
not advise on, choose, or exercise any control over the plaintiff’s decision 
to invest in the impugned real estate”,66 the solicitor facilitated a scenario 
in which losses occurred that would not have transpired but for his 
actions.67 Consequently, his actions ought to be seen as being as directly 
related to the loss in Canson as Simms’ failure to disclose his conflict of 
interest is to the loss in Hodgkinson. 
64. While it is plausible to suggest that, had the events subsequent to the real 
estate transaction occurred at a different time, an alternate soil engineer 
and pile-driving company may have been hired by Canson and Fealty 
who would not have been negligent and the warehouse would have been 
constructed without sinking or causing loss, such speculation is wholly 
irrelevant. Using the same logic, it could equally be said that had the 
situation in Hodgkinson arisen at a different time, there may not have been 
a real estate market downturn subsequent to Hodgkinson’s purchase of 
the MURBs, with the result that he would not have lost the value of his 
MURBs, or perhaps may not have lost as much as he did.
65. See Hodgkinson, supra note 14 (where Sopinka, McLachlin and Major JJ 
determined that “[t]he loss in value was caused by an economic downturn 
which did not reflect any inadequacy in the advice provided by the 
respondent. We would reject application of the ‘but for’ approach to 
causation in circumstances where the loss resulted from forces beyond the 
control of the respondent who, the trial judge determined, had provided 
otherwise sound investment advice” at 226).
66. Hodgkinson, supra note 14 at 203.
67. Assuming, of course, that we believe Canson and Fealty were telling the 
truth when they stated they would not have closed the purchase of the 
land in question had they known of the flip and increase in purchase 
price, which would then have precluded them from taking any actions to 
develop the land in question because it would not have been theirs.
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D.  Summary
In light of the disparate judgments in Canson and Hodgkinson, how may 
one summarize the present position of the Supreme Court of Canada on 
the merger of law and equity? Canson clearly endorses their substantive 
fusion, as indicated most readily in La Forest J’s judgment: 
[i]n time the common law outstripped equity and the remedy of compensation 
became [somewhat] atrophied. Under these circumstances, why should it not 
borrow from the experience of the common law? Whether the courts refine the 
equitable tools such as the remedy of compensation, or follow the common 
law on its own terms, seems not particularly important where the same policy 
objective is sought.68
However, La Forest J’s majority judgment in the Hodgkinson case, while 
not directly addressing the issue of fusion, is wholly inconsistent with the 
conclusion that legal and equitable jurisdictions in Canada have been 
substantively merged.
Canson’s endorsement of fusion eliminates the potential benefits 
associated with choosing an equitable versus common law cause of action. 
This determination is certainly at odds with the principle established in 
Nocton v Lord Ashburton,69 the case which famously resurrected equitable 
compensation. In that case, Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane states 
that a court of equity will not refuse jurisdiction to hear a matter simply 
because the plaintiff may have available remedies at common law:
[i]t did not matter that the client would have had a remedy in damages for 
breach of contract. Courts of Equity had jurisdiction to direct accounts to be 
68. Canson, supra note 13 at 153. Curiously, this statement appears 
to contradict La Forest J’s earlier statement in LAC Minerals Ltd v 
International Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 2 SCR 574 [Lac Minerals] 
(where La Forest J stated that “I do not countenance the view that a 
proprietary remedy can be imposed whenever it is ‘just’ to do so, unless 
further guidance can be given as to what those situations may be. To allow 
such a result would be to leave the determination of proprietary rights 
to ‘some mix of judicial discretion’ ... subjective views about which party 
‘ought to win’ ... and ‘the formless void of individual moral opinion’ per 
Deane J in Muschinski v. Dodds (1985), 160 C.L.R. 583, at p.616” at para 
196).
69. (1914), AC 932 (HL).
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taken, and in proper cases to order the solicitor to replace property improperly 
acquired from the client, or to make compensation if he had lost it by acting 
in breach of a duty which arose out of his confidential relationship to the man 
who had trusted him.70
Curiously, La Forest J acknowledges this same principle in M(K) v 
M(H),71 where he expressly indicates that “a breach of fiduciary duty 
cannot be automatically overlooked in favour of concurrent common 
law claims”.72
Even in Hodgkinson, La Forest J recognizes that “the existence of 
a contract does not necessarily preclude the existence of fiduciary 
obligations between the parties ... ”.73 Yet, La Forest J also refers positively 
to his finding of the substantive fusion of law and equity in Canson in 
his judgment in Hodgkinson.74 This internal inconsistency plagues 
his judgment in Hodgkinson, where his recognition of the purpose of 
70. Ibid at 956-57; see also Roe, McNeill & Co v McNeill (1998), 45 BCLR 
(3d) 35 (CA )(“[i]t would be anomalous indeed that the parties should 
have stipulated in the contract for one to owe a duty of good faith to 
the other, and for him to have been found in breach of that contractual 
duty, but that the law would deprive the other of a remedy for breach of 
fiduciary duty because he already had a remedy in contract” at para 38).
71. (1992), 96 DLR (4th) 289 (SCC).
72. Ibid at 323; refer also back to La Forest J’s statement in LAC Minerals, 
supra note 68.
73. Hodgkinson, supra note 14 at 174.
74. Ibid (“[a]s I noted in Canson, at pp. 152-3, this approach is in accordance 
with the fusion of law and equity that occurred near the turn of the 
century under the auspices of the old Judicature Acts … Thus, properly 
understood Canson stands for the proposition that courts should strive to 
treat similar wrongs similarly, regardless of the particular cause or causes 
of action that may have been pleaded” at 202). 
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fiduciary relief belies his endorsement of fusion in Canson.75 It also 
creates difficulty for those seeking a clear vision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s perspective on fusion. The result is a rather muddled Canadian 
jurisprudence on the matter of fusion that lacks consistency and guidance 
for future applications.76
In characterizing the fusion of law and equity as including substantive 
matters, important distinctions between legal and equitable concepts and 
remedies have been inappropriately blurred. These distinctions are both 
historical and substantive; further, their implications reflect the separate 
historical rationale for and genesis behind the development of English 
75. It is implicit in La Forest J’s judgment in Hodgkinson that there are no 
comparable policy considerations at common law that would supersede 
the use of fiduciary principles. Thus, the policy underlying the fiduciary 
concept which La Forest J expressly recognizes in Hodgkinson provides 
an unequivocal example of the “different policy considerations” that 
he suggests in Canson “should give rise to different levels of redress” 
for claims of breach of fiduciary duty versus breach of common law 
obligations: Canson, supra note 13 at 148.
76. It should be recognized, though, that Canson is not the only 
contemporary judgment in the common law world that has characterized 
the fusion of law and equity as including substantive matters; see 
e.g.United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Council (1978), AC 904 
(HL )(where it was stated that “[m]y Lords ... this metaphor has in my 
view become both mischievous and deceptive. The innate conservatism 
of English lawyers may have made them slow to recognise that by the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 the two systems of substantive 
and adjectival law formerly administered by courts of law and Courts 
of Chancery ... were fused. … If Professor Ashburner’s fluvial metaphor 
is to be retained at all, the waters of the confluent streams of law and 
equity have surely mingled now” at 924-25); see also LeMesurier v Andrus 
(1986), 54 OR (2d) 1 (CA)(where the Ontario Court of Appeal states 
that “[w]hatever the original intention of the Legislature, the fusion of 
law and equity is now real and total” at 9); whereas, in Aquaculture Corp 
v New Zealand Green Mussel Co Ltd (1990), 3 NZLR 299 (CA) it is 
said that “[f ]or all purposes now material, equity and common law are 
mingled or merged. The practicality of the matter is that ... a full range 
of remedies should be available as appropriate, no matter whether they 
originated in common law, equity or statute” at 301.
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Equity. As Justice of Appeal Keane explains: 
[t]he ethical values of individual restraint, mutuality and social responsibility 
at play within the framework bequeathed by Chancery differ from the 
individualism and the universalism of the common law. To regard equitable 
doctrines as modular, so that they may be mixed and matched with common 
law rules so as to expand the scope of the judicial branch of government’s 
regulation of self-interested action is to fail to appreciate these differences.77
Notably, most judgments supporting the substantive fusion of law and 
equity are rather far removed from the time when those jurisdictions 
were merged. Further, they ignore significant and straightforward 
commentary by judges and noted scholars that were contemporaneous 
with or much closer in time to that occurrence and which find only an 
77. Patrick Keane, “The 2009 WA Lee Lecture in Equity: The Conscience 
of Equity” 10:1 Queensland University of Technology and Law Justice 
Journal 106 at 131.
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administrative merging to have occurred rather than a substantive one.78 
Perhaps most tellingly, they rarely provide substantive commentary or 
78. Hansard, 3d Series, vol 214 (see in particular statements made by Lord 
Selborne, LC, who introduced the legislation merging common law and 
equity in Britain (the Judicature Acts), and Attorney-General Sir John 
Coleridge, who promoted it. Lord Selborne said “[i]t may be asked ... 
why not abolish at once all distinction between law and equity? I can best 
answer that by asking another question – Do you wish to abolish trusts? 
If trusts are to continue, there must be a distinction between what we call 
a legal [estate] and an equitable estate ... The distinction, within certain 
limits, between law and equity, is real and natural, and it would be a 
mistake to suppose that what is real and natural ought to be disregarded” 
at 339); see also Hansard, 3d Series, vol 216 (where Coleridge expressed 
essentially similar sentiments: “[t]o talk of the fusion of Law and Equity 
was to talk ignorantly. Law and Equity were two things inherently 
distinct ... All they could do was to secure that the suitor who went to one 
Court for his remedy should not be sent about his business without the 
relief [which] he could have got in another Court” at 1601); see further 
Hansard, 3d Series, vol 216 (where Coleridge makes the purpose of the 
legislation unequivocal: “[t]he defect of our legal system was, not that 
Law and Equity existed, but that if a man went for relief to a Court of 
Law, and an equitable claim or an equitable defence arose, he must go 
to some other Court and begin afresh. Law and Equity, therefore, would 
remain if the Bill passed, but they would be administered concurrently, 
and no one would be sent to get in one Court the relief which another 
Court had refused to give ... It was more philosophical to admit the 
innate distinction between Law and Equity, which you could not get 
rid of by Act of Parliament, and to say, not that the distinction should not 
exist, but that the Courts should administer relief according to legal principles 
when these applied, or else according to equitable principles. That was what 
the Bill proposed, with the addition that, whenever the principles of Law 
and Equity conflicted, equitable principles should prevail” at 644-45 
[emphasis added]); see also Ind Coope & Co v Emerson (1887), 12 App 
Cas 300 at 308 (HL) and the discussion in Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra 
note 3 ch 4.
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rationales to support their contentions.79
While the boundary between the common law and equity is becoming 
increasingly blurred, it is important to recall, as Keeton explains, that “the 
distinction between common law and equity is not only one of history, 
but also one of attitude”.80 To substantively “fuse” legal and equitable 
jurisdictions would have required something more explicit than what 
may be seen in the legislation blending those jurisdictions in the various 
countries where such action was taken. What may be taken from this 
finding is to further affirm that the administrative fusion of common 
law and equitable jurisdictions altered procedure, but did not affect 
the distinct nature of legal and equitable doctrines.81 In explaining the 
distinctiveness of legal and equitable principles, Loughlan states:
[s]ince equitable principles such as those applicable to fiduciaries fulfil a 
different social purpose from the law of contract and of tort, imposing, as they 
do, a strong duty to act only in the interests of the other, it is by no means 
clear that principles developed in respect to common law obligations should 
be utilised in the equitable jurisdiction.82
The important distinction that remained after the merger of law and 
79. Meagher, Gummow, & Lehane, supra note 2 (“[t]hose who assert that 
law and equity are fused rarely (if ever) explain what they mean, how it 
happened and what follows from it” at 66); see also the essentially similar 
comments in JRF Lehane, Book Review of Specific Performance by Gareth 
Jones & William Goodhart, (1987) 46:1 Cambridge Law Journal 163 
(“[t]hose who assert that law and equity are fused should explain what 
they mean, how it happened and what follows from it” at 165).
80. George W Keeton, An Introduction to Equity, 6d (London: Pitman, 1956) 
at 43-44; see also Allen, supra note 16 (“[t]here is still a frontier between 
the Common Law and the Chancery. The training is different, the habit 
of thought is different, the subjects of jurisdiction are different” at 413). 
81. See Edmund HT Snell, The Principles of Equity, 11d by Archibald Brown 
(London: Stevens & Haynes, 1894)(“[t]he distinction between Law and 
Equity ... will be found to be a distinction not so much of substance 
as of form, a distinction not of principle but of history ... and yet the 
distinction ... has not, as we shall presently see, been materially affected 
even by the recent so-called fusion of Law and Equity” at 2).
82. Patricia Loughlan, “The Historical Role of the Equitable Jurisdiction” in 
Patrick A Parkinson, ed, The Principles of Equity (Sydney: Law Book Co of 
Australasia, 1996) at 23-24.
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equity is, indeed, one of history and attitude, but also one of profoundly 
distinct ideas and approaches to law, leading to different results. Thus, 
“the measure of relief under the common law and Equity ought not be 
similar where the nature of common law and equitable duties — and 
their underlying policy rationales — are dissimilar”.83
V. The Status of the “Fusion” Argument in Canada 
Today
In the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark judgment in Pettkus v 
Becker,84 which entrenched the remedial constructive trust in Canadian 
jurisprudence, Justice Dickson, as he then was, explained that “[t]he great 
advantage of ancient principles of equity is their flexibility: the judiciary 
is thus able to shape these malleable principles so as to accommodate 
the changing needs and mores of society, in order to achieve justice”.85 
Although equity emphasizes the spirit and intent of law over more formal 
compliance with established rules or procedures and equitable principles 
may be shaped to fit the changing needs and mores of society, there are 
limits to their application. Equitable principles are not appropriately 
used in any situation in which there may be a need or desire for a novel 
application of law. Rather, they are properly limited by the parameters 
established via the maxims and principles of equity. 
Maintaining a jurisprudential system that appropriately balances 
the certainty of law with the malleability of equity requires a delicate 
equilibrium that neither tilts too far toward taxonomy or arbitrariness. 
83. Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 3 at 703; see also Justice of Appeal 
Heydon’s judgment in Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003), 56 NSWLR 
298 (CA (Austl))(“[i]t is not irrational to maintain the existence of 
different remedies for different causes of action having different threshold 
requirements and different purposes. The resulting differences are not 
necessarily ‘anomalous’” at 404). 
84. (1980), 117 DLR (3d) 257 (SCC).
85. Ibid at 273; see also La Forest J in Canson, supra note 13 (where La Forest 
J emphasizes that “the maxims of equity can be flexibly adapted to serve 
the ends of justice as perceived in our days. They are not rules that must 
be rigorously applied but malleable principles intended to serve the ends 
of fairness and justice” at 151).
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Part of the challenge of such a system is to stay true to the historical and 
doctrinal roots of common law and equitable doctrines, notwithstanding 
the administrative merging of law and equity and the resultant blurring 
of lines between legal and equitable doctrines over time. This challenge 
exists not only in Canadian law, but in every jurisdiction where the 
creation of some form of equity designed to ameliorate the rigour of the 
common law has played an important role in the shaping of modern legal 
discourse. 
Writing in the early stages of the 20th century, American legal 
scholar Roscoe Pound postulated that traditional equity had been 
transformed over time into a decadent system of rules that destroyed its 
existence as a process of facilitating justice premised upon the measured 
use of judicial discretion.86 Pound referenced a number of judgments 
that he believed reinforced his conclusion. What he failed to consider, 
however, was that the cases he referenced did not signify the decadence 
of equity, but instead were, as Walsh appropriately characterizes them, 
“illustrations of mistaken law applied by courts in apparent ignorance 
of the law involved, in no way indicating any decadence of equity”.87 
More specifically, those cases evidence the courts’ misunderstanding of 
the merger of legal and equitable jurisdictions much like the Supreme 
Court of Canada incorrectly characterizes the fusion of law and equity in 
the Canson case.88
In the aftermath of Hodgkinson, one may see how the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s problematic holding in Canson could have been resolved 
differently had the court properly understood the implications of the 
merging of legal and equitable jurisdictions. Dean Pound did not have 
that same benefit. What Pound saw as the “decadence of equity” was, 
instead, multiple occasions of courts making mistakes based upon their 
common misunderstanding of what merging law and equity meant for 
the practice of law. Had those courts possessed a sounder appreciation of 
this merger, Pound would then likely have been extolling the virtues of the 
86. Roscoe Pound, “The Decadence of Equity” (1905) 5:1 Columbia Law 
Review 20 [Pound, “Decadence”].
87. Walsh, supra note 5 at 480.
88. Canson, supra note 13.
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continuation of equitable principles without the chaos and inefficiency 
caused by maintaining separate jurisdictions for law and equity rather 
than bemoaning the decadence of equity and the crystallization of its 
principles into a rigid system of rules and precedent. 
Better education about the implications of the statutorily mandated 
merger of law and equity would not only have prevented the types of 
erroneous judgments cited by Pound, but also those in Canson. Such 
a development would have also assisted in fulfilling Dean Pound’s 
recommendation to be vigilant and fight for the survival of a strong 
and principled equity — an understanding of equity that facilitated 
justice by tempering law, where appropriate, with more benevolent and 
situationally-apposite equitable principles.89 However, it would also have 
been a complete reversal of the trend that witnessed law schools in Canada 
and the United States move away from the teaching of substantive equity 
more than two generations ago.90
To the contemporary law student, “equity” is far more likely to 
be associated with a form of investment in corporate finance courses, 
a form of interest in land, or principles of fairness in administrative, 
constitutional, or employment law than as a complementary system 
to the common law. However, the traditional understanding of equity 
as complementing the common law still plays an important role in 
contemporary jurisprudence and needs to be appropriately recognized 
for its vital function. The function of equity is not fully comprehended 
when it is regarded solely as a method by which the rigours of the 
common law are tempered and its gaps filled, nor when it is seen as a 
competing, though complementary, system to the positive law. Equity is 
more appropriately and accurately understood when it is recognized as a 
89. Pound, “Decadence”, supra note 86 (“[w]e must be vigilant ... we must 
fight for our law. No less must we fight for equity. Law must be tempered 
with equity, even as justice with mercy. And if, as some assert, mercy is 
part of justice, we may say equally that equity is part of law, in the sense 
that it is necessary to the working of any legal system” at 35).
90. Refer back to the discussion, supra note 8.
532 
 
Rotman, The “Fusion” of Law and Equity?
process by which positive law is brought closer to the human condition.91 
Equity is a way of facilitating justice in the broadest sense of the term92 
while providing sound parameters for the exercise of judicial discretion.
Equity works alongside law, supporting the latter where it is deficient 
and enabling it to better respond to the individual requirements of 
particular circumstances that the operation of its taxonomic tendencies 
hold in check. It occupies a complementary jurisdiction to law that 
supports and enhances it without being either inferior to the law or lesser 
in importance.93 The development and situation-specific application of 
equitable principles provides law with a sense of humanity and context, 
which makes law more just.94 In accomplishing these diverse tasks, equity 
does not replace law, but maintains a conceptual separation from it, all 
91. Watt, supra note 11 (“[e]quity is not Utopian, it simply reaches beyond 
the routines of law towards the particularities of the human condition” 
at 243); see also Ryan, supra note 11 (“[e]quity is a process, but it is a 
process of a far broader and more important kind than procedure, even 
when this is taken in its widest possible sense. Equity viewed as a process 
accomplished the conversion of morality into law; procedure is merely the 
means of recognizing the conversion in a particular case ... ” at 222).
92. Burke v Lfot Pty Ltd (2002), 209 CLR 282 (HCA)(Kirby J states that 
the “business” of equity is “the attainment of justice” at 324); see also 
Oleck, supra note 12 (“[e]quity, certainly in its historical moral sense, and 
hopefully in its administrative sense, is the principal technique thus far 
developed to make certain that law always will be readily adaptable for, 
and directed toward, the achievement of justice” at 44); Watt, supra note 
11 (“[w]ithout equity, the law’s story becomes all rules and no justice” at 
45; and “[e]quity does not set out to produce an ideally righteous system 
… but it sets out to make the system of regular law more just” at 102-
103); see also Ryan, supra note 11 (“[w]hat is necessary is to have some 
adequate grasp of Equity as a built-in dynamism necessary for progress 
in any system which purports to administer justice” at 217); Robert H 
Rogers, “A Lesson in Equity” (1915) 49:4 American Law Review 510 (“[l]
egal justice is the law’s attempt at approximate justice from the standpoint 
of social expediency … But the justice of equity, as originally intended 
and administered, was man’s best attempt to arrive at real justice regardless 
of law or rule” at 535).
93. See supra note 17. 
94. See the references, supra note 12. 
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the while harmonizing law with the needs and requirements of evolving 
social structures and relationships.
These effects did not disappear, nor were they meant to disappear, with 
the merger of legal and equitable jurisdictions. Rather, quite the opposite 
intent was facilitated. Once equitable principles were operational within 
common law courts, the inevitable bleeding of equity into the common 
law occurred95 and, with it, the facilitation of more situationally-specific 
and appropriate methods of resolving conflict. New causes of action like 
unconscionability and breach of confidence were created specifically as 
a result of the jurisdictional merger of legal and equitable jurisdictions 
that allowed for their development. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s recent judgment in Bhasin v Hrynew96 and its articulation of a 
general, good faith standard in contract law indicates the continuation 
and expansion of this practice.
In Bhasin, the Supreme Court holds that the principle of good 
faith is a fundamental element of contract law. The court clearly and 
unequivocally articulates that “good faith contractual performance is a 
general organizing principle of the common law of contract”.97 Although 
the court recognizes that “Anglo-Canadian common law has resisted 
acknowledging any generalized and independent doctrine of good faith 
performance of contracts”,98 it nonetheless holds that the concept of good 
faith “underpins and informs the various rules in which the common law, 
in various situations and types of relationships, recognizes obligations of 
good faith contractual performance”.99 The court further recognizes that 
one “manifestation of this organizing principle of good faith, [is] that 
there is a common law duty which applies to all contracts to act honestly 
in the performance of contractual obligations”.100 Consequently, it would 
95. See Zechariah Chafee Jr, “Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts?” (1926) 
75:1 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 
1 at 5, 20.
96. 2014 SCC 71 at para 33 [Bhasin].
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid at para 32.
99. Ibid at para 33.
100. Ibid.
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appear that, in the aftermath of Bhasin, parties to contractual dealings 
are implicitly understood to have duties of good faith towards each other 
in the execution of their contractual obligations. This development is an 
example of what can be described as “equitable bleed” — where concepts 
of equity are allowed to bleed into the common law and themselves 
become a part of the latter.
In determining that good faith ought to be recognized as foundational 
to Canadian contract law, the Supreme Court in Bhasin sought to “develop 
the common law to keep in step with the ‘dynamic and evolving fabric of 
our society’”.101 This is precisely the function that equity plays in keeping 
the common law current, relevant, and situationally-appropriate. Part 
of ensuring the Canadian law of contracts remains consistent with the 
evolving fabric of Canadian society is to ensure that contract law reflects 
not only the reasonable expectations of the parties, but also the moral 
underpinnings of dealings between individuals in a manner consistent 
with the expectations and mores of Canadian society as a whole. Expressly 
incorporating good faith into all contractual dealings entails the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that contemporary Canadian society is disinclined to 
accept sharp dealing or attempts to evade responsibility as acceptable in 
contractual relationships. Parties are expected to live up to the obligations 
they expressly agreed to when they sign contracts.
Post-Bhasin, then, the principled foundation of Canadian contract 
law more closely resembles the law applicable to unjust enrichment or 
even breaches of fiduciary duty than it did previously. This is not to say 
that contract law is now to be understood as either giving rise to remedial 
constructive trusts, seen as analogous to fiduciary law, or indicating 
the substantive fusion of historic legal and equitable jurisdictions. 
Rather, it signifies that Canadian tolerance for breaching contracts has 
lessened. With this reduction in tolerance comes the recognition that it 
is appropriate for law to enlarge the range of relief to remedy breaches 
of contract in a manner akin to what was historically done in equity so 
long as doing so does not result in doctrinal impropriety or an improper 
blurring of the conceptual distinctions between historic legal and 
101. Bhasin, supra note 96 at para 40.
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equitable jurisdictions.
Following the administration fusion of legal and equitable 
jurisdictions, the concepts of equity continued to complement and 
supplement the law just as they had when the common law and equity 
maintained their historically separate existence, but also to inform 
and modify the law where necessary while retaining their important 
conceptual separation from law. When both common law and equitable 
causes of action become available within a court with jurisdiction over 
both, procedural dilemmas and difficulties subsided, confusion abated, 
and the requirements of justice were better served. 
Today, with the concurrent administration of the common law and 
equity in a unified court, the contemporary judge has a wider range 
of tools available to mete out situationally and doctrinally appropriate 
justice. This is to be celebrated, not sabotaged, even unintentionally, by 
the subordination of equitable doctrines to those of the common law 
as under a substantive merging of legal and equitable jurisdictions. As 
Chafee wrote almost 100 years ago:
[o]ur single court of law and equity is like a workman with numerous tools 
lying before him. For some tasks he may want to use either the hard blows of 
the action for damages or the flexible injunction, according to circumstances. 
For other jobs, like the suppression of battery, the injunction is [wholly 
unjustified, and] only damages [or prosecution will serve]. There remains, 
however, delicate work where damages are of no use and bound to do harm, and 
yet an injunction would produce admirable results. Under such circumstances, 
no sound argument exists for a refusal to employ the appropriate tool, merely 
because he can not use another tool which does not meet the need at all. So long 
as judges are not expressly prohibited from using such a legitimate remedy as 
the injunction for a purpose which it will effectually obtain, the non-existence 
of an action for damages should be immaterial. As it is the function of a factory 
to produce goods, so it is the function of courts to produce justice, and they 
should feel free to use for that object all or any of the means which long custom 
and legislation have placed at their disposal.102
VI. Conclusion
Although the Bhasin judgment appears to provide a clear indication 
of the continued presence and prominence of equitable principles in 
102. Chafee, supra note 95 at 35.
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Canadian law, the inconsistency between the Canson and Hodgkinson 
decisions has not been revisited and thereby remains an impediment to 
characterizing the current understanding and application of fusion in 
Canadian law. While Canson seems to evidence the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s acceptance of the substantive merging of legal and equitable 
jurisdictions, the majority judgment in Hodgkinson retreats from Canson’s 
subordination of equitable constructs to their common law counterparts. 
Instead, it founds liability in a manner that is consistent with equity’s 
emphasis on conscience and adopts equity’s interpretation of causation 
by abandoning reliance on considerations such as foreseeability, 
remoteness, and intervening act that played a significant role in Canson. 
This unaddressed inconsistency between these important judgments is 
a troubling source of confusion and uncertainty for the contemporary 
understanding of fusion in Canadian law. However, in light of what the 
Supreme Court has subsequently articulated in Bhasin, it would appear 
that the Supreme Court has gravitated away from the idea of substantive 
fusion that it articulated in Canson. That would be a significant advance 
for the evolving law in Canada.
While it appears that Canada continues to embrace the foundational 
principles of equity in its jurisprudence, there remain some nagging 
considerations revolving around the treatment of causation and the 
ability of litigants to select equitable versus common law causes of action 
without interference from the courts. One wonders whether the Canadian 
experience is a bellwether for other jurisdictions. Whether it is or is not, 
it nonetheless offers an important perspective on the merging of law and 
equity that is relevant to the administration of justice in contemporary 
law.
